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Abstract 
The divergence between the willingness-to-pay (WTP) and willingness-to-accept (WTA) has 
resulted in two explanations. First, that this may be due to the manifestation of the endowment 
effect (Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler, 1991). Second, the difference between WTA and WTP is 
directly related with the substitutability of the goods (Haneman, 1991). In this paper we show that 
one can observe undertrading in markets even if the WTA-WTP discrepancy is negligible.  Due to 
underrevelation of intramarginal units very flat reported inverse supply and demand curves are 
obtained. As a result very small deviations in reported WTA and WTP can lead to undertrading. 
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The Background 
 The emergence of empirical evidence suggesting divergence between the willingness-to-
accept (WTA), for the sale of an object, and the willingness-to-pay (WTP), for the purchase of an 
object, has resulted in two explanations.  One of the explanations was proposed by Kahneman, 
Knetsch and Thaler (1991) (hereafter KKT), that the discrepancy between the WTP and the 
WTA may be a manifestation of the endowment effect.  Thus,  “... endowment effects will almost 
certainly occur when owners are faced with an opportunity to sell an item purchased for use that 
is not easily replaceable” (p. 1344).  Further they argue that the endowment effect will not apply 
when the goods are purchased for resale and not for use; there is no endowment effect for the 
retail firm, only for the consumer purchasing the firm’s good.  Similarly, they argue that the 
endowment effect does not apply to the exchange of tokens (or rights) to which private 
redemption values, or induced values have been assigned by the experimenter (Smith, 1976). 
 The second explanation came from Hanemann (1991) who showed that when close 
substitutes exist for the good in question (and given positive income elasticity) WTA and WTP 
can be shown to be very close, and vice-versa. 
 Given the explanations for the divergence between the average WTA and WTP the 
experimental literature focused on direct choice tests of these (theoretical) explanations, and 
there examination in market contexts. 
 The first choice, and exchange, experiments were run by KKT establishing the 
endowment effect for Cornell and other (emblem) coffee mugs but not for induced value tokens.  
These were followed by experiments from Shogren et al. (1994) and Franciosi et al. (1996).  
Shogren et al. establish that the Hanneman hypothesis under repeat play is robust and that the 
divergence between the WTA and WTP disappears with repeat interaction for close substitutes 
but not for imperfect substitutes.  Further, in their experimental setting (distinct from that of 
KKT) they show that under repeat interaction the endowment effect disappears.  Franciosi et al. 
show that we can observe undertrading in markets even if the WTA-WTP discrepancy is 
negligible.  This is the result of underrevelation of intramarginal units leading to very flat 
reported inverse supply and demand so that very small deviations in reported WTA and WTP can 
lead to undertrading. 
The Experiments 
Kahneman-Knetsch-Thaler Choice Experiments: 
 In the typical experiment of KKT an undergraduate class is divided into equal parts.  Half 
the subjects were randomly assigned to the role of buyers and the other half sellers. University 
emblem coffee mugs (Cornell, Simon Fraser, or University of British Columbia), costing around 
$6 in the local University bookstore, were then distributed to the sellers, and all the buyers were 
given the opportunity to examine the mug.  The following forms were then executed. 
     I Will Sell  I Will Keep 
        [Buy]  [Not Buy] the Mug 
 If the price is $0  __________  __________ 
 If the price is $0.50  __________  __________ 
 ..... 
 If the price is $9.50  __________  __________ 
 
 
 Next, a random price (KKT used the  BDM procedure, in Becker et al., 1964) was drawn 
from the list between $0 and $9.50, and exchanges were conducted by the experimenter on the 
basis of this price.  The typical result was a median selling price that was double the median 
buying price, an observation that is consistent with the endowment effect.  KKT, however, 
recognized that this procedure did not control for any income effect.  This problem was 
exacerbated by the fact that buyers in their experiments were required to use their own funds 
while the sellers were given the coffee mugs. 
 To address the need to control for income effects KKT (pp. 179-80) developed an 
ingenious variation on the above experiments. Instead of two groups they used three: sellers, 
buyers and choosers.  The sellers/buyers made the same choices as before, while the choosers 
were asked to choose at each prospective price between the mug, or cash.  Thus, sellers were 
given a mug, and choosers were given the right to either a mug or cash as they chose; any income 
effect on sellers as distinct from buyers, should then also apply to the choosers.  The difference 
according to the KKT implementation of the endowment effect is that sellers own the mug, 
choosers do not. 
 Their results were clear: choosers behave more like buyers than like sellers, although 
choosers value mugs sixty percent more highly than buyers.  (See KKT, p. 178-80). 
Franciosi et al. Choice Experiments 
 Franciosi et al. conducted four experiments each with 24 subjects (8 in each group; N=96 
subjects in total) motivated by the three-group design which controlled for any income effect. 
However, they made several instructional changes which might be important in the context of the 
choice experiments due to their framing effects.  Because the use of emotive terms such as 
“buying,” and “selling” may alter the strategic behavior of market participants, Franciosi et al. 
(1996) neutralized their instructions and removed all mention of “buying” or “selling.”   Instead 
they use expressions that did not suggest any specific role behavior on the part of market 
participants.  First, the three groups were simply called Group 1, Group 2 and Group 3.  The 
subjects were told that each member of Group 1 is an owner of an Arizona Wildcat Mug, and 
their task is to choose, for each amount of money (no mention of “price”), between retaining their 
mug or, accepting the additional amount of money.  Each member of Group 2 was designated as 
having the right to choose between accepting a mug, or retaining an amount of money out of their 
earnings in a previous unrelated experiment in the same session.  Finally, each person in Group 3 
is designated as having the right to choose between a mug or accepting an additional amount of 
money.  Thus, all subjects were symmetrically described as choosers, but under different initial 
conditions. 
 All their choice experiments were run at the end of two simultaneous posted offer market 
experiments (6 buyers, 6 sellers in each), reported in Franciosi et al. (1995). Subjects were 
assigned to the three groups randomly, and were paid their earnings in cash at the end of the 
market experiments.  Earnings ranged from $8.75-$62.50 providing all Group 2 subjects with 
sufficient funds to obtain a mug based on the experimental prices.  The mugs were priced at 
$9.95 (price tags removed) in the campus bookstore. 
 From Table 1 it can be seen that the subjects report substantially lower Group 1 WTA, a 
somewhat higher WTP, and a higher Group 3 WTA, than did the KKT subjects.  Substituting a 
choice task for the buying and selling tasks appears to narrow the WTA-WTP discrepancy.  
Pairwise statistical tests, however, show that the data from all three groups come from different 
distributions (Franciosi, et a., 1996).  Hence, the qualitative differences among the three groups, 
as postulated by KKT, were supported as is evident in the last row of Table 1. 
KKT (1991) Exchange experiments: 
 In addition to their BDM choice experiments KKT report the results of several exchange 
experiments.  Half the subjects were randomly assigned the role of buyers, the others sellers.  
Sellers were each endowed with a mug, while the former used money they had been asked to 
bring to class. Buyers each submitted a bid price to buy a mug, sellers each submitted an offer 
price to sell the mug.  Their ‘bids’ and ‘offers’ were solicited by asking each subject to choose 
between a price and a mug for a series of prices as in the BDM procedure except that the range 
starts at $0.25 and goes up in increments of $0.50.  The intersection of the descending bids and 
ascending offers determines the price and quantity exchanged.  If there are no endowment or 
income effects, then due to the random allocation of subjects to the buy or sell condition, the 
supply schedule of those given the mugs should be a mirror image of the demand schedule for 
those not given the mugs.  This leads to the prediction that one-half of the mugs should trade. 
Consequently, in their experiments with 22 buyers and 22 sellers, 11 mugs were predicted to 
trade.  They observe that between 1 and 4 trade at prices between $4.25 and $4.75.  As before 
only one bid/offer trial is chosen at random. 
Mug Exchange Experiments using Uniform Price Double Auction 
 Franciosi et al. (1996) used the uniform price double auction (UPDA) mechanism to 
study mug exchange due to its strong equilibrating properties.  (See McCabe, Rassenti and 
Smith, 1993).  The authors felt that using an efficient auction market mechanism may be crucial 
to testing the undertrading hypothesis.  
 Two series of experiments were run.  In each experiment 24 different subjects were 
randomly assigned to groups of 12 buyers and 12 sellers.  Each series was divided into parts 1 
and 2.  In Part 1 of series 1 each buyer was assigned a value and each seller a cost from the 
uniform distribution on [$0, $9.99] at the beginning of each of 10 (or 12) trading periods.  This 
baseline served as a training session.  All periods lasted 4 minutes.  In Part 2, Series 1 and 2, each 
buyer was endowed with a $9.99 cash balance which was theirs to keep if no mug was 
purchased; each seller was endowed with a University of Arizona emblem mug priced at $9.95 
which was theirs to keep if not sold. Each subject was paid in cash all of their earnings from the 
induced value training experiments in Part 1 of each of the sessions.  In series 2, Part 1 used the 
constant volume equilibrium environment, but in each period a random constant was added to 
each value, and the values randomly assigned to each individual.  Part 2 of series 2 was like that 
of series 1 except that  the price tag ($9.95) was left on each mug, and this was pointed out to the 
subjects.  This was a treatment to reduce uncertainty concerning the cash or market value of the 
mug in each group.  Also in series 2 the trading time for mug exchange was increased from 4 to 6 
minutes in four of the six experiments.  This was done because it seemed that subjects were still 
adjusting their bids and offers when the period ended after 4 minutes.  The experimental designs 
are summarized in Table 2. 
 The trading volume in the two series of experiments is plotted in Figure 1.  Comparing 
the results with the KKT experiments it is clear that in these experiments there was much less 
undertrading.  In three of the eleven experiments half of the mugs trade as predicted by standard 
theory.  In the KKT exchanges no more than one-third of the mugs ever trade.  But undertrading 
still occurs.  How can undertrading be reconciled with the Shogren, et al. (1994) finding that the 
WTP-WTA discrepancy converges to miniscule levels?  The answer is as follows:  Francioso, et 
al. observe that the reported supply and demand schedules using UPDA are very flat, with many 
bids to buy and offers to sell very near the market clearing price.  Hence, undertrading can result 
from very slight underrevelation, although there is little discrepancy between WTA and WTP. 
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Experiment WTA  
sellers 
WTP 
Buyers 
WTA 
choosers 
WTA-S/ 
WTP-B 
WTA-S/ 
WTA-C 
Sample 
size, N 
KKT 6 and 7 $6.89 $1.91 $3.05 $3.61 $1.60 194 
 WTA 
Group 1 
WTP 
Group 2 
WTA 
Group 3 
WTA-1/ 
WTP-2 
WTA-1/ 
WTA-3 
 
U of A $5.36 $2.19 $3.88 2.45 1.38 120 
 
 
Table 1.  Row 2 lists the mean WTA and WTP prices obtained from experiments 6 and 7 
reported by KKT for mugs and other objects at Simon Fraser and UBC.  Row 4 lists the 
corresponding means from the University of Arizona experiments.  In the latter all subjects make 
choices:  Group 1 endowed with a mug; Group 2 endowed with money earned in a pre 
experiment in the same session; Group 3 endowed with the right to choose either a mug or 
additional money.  The U of A procedures yield lower seller WTA, higher buyer WTP and higher 
chooser WTA than the KKT procedures.  But the qualitative relationship among the treatment 
measures of value are preserved as in KKT. 
 
  
 
 Series 1 Series 2 
Part 1 Induced Values [0,$9.99]; 
random equilibrium;  
4 min periods 
Induced Values [0,$9.99]; 
constant equilibrium; 
4 min periods 
Part 2 Buyers: $9.99 
Sellers: one mug each 
4 min periods 
Buyers: $9.99 
Sellers: one mug each 
4 and 6 min periods 
$9.95 price tag left on mug 
Number of Experiments 
(subjects) 
4(96) 7(144) 
 
Table 2.  Part 1 in each of two series of experiments used induced value supply and demand 
schedules to train subjects in the Uniform Price Double Auction (McCabe, Rassenti and smith, 
1993).  The environment was one in which the random equilibrium prices and volumes were 
comparable to what would by expected, theoretically, in the subsequent mug trading 
experiments.  In Part 2 buyers were endowed with $9.99 as in Part 1, but sellers were endowed 
with University of Arizona emblem mugs and cash was traded for mugs.  A total of 4 
experiments were run in Series 1, and 7 in Series 2. 
Figure 1.  See Table 2 for a description of the series 1 and series 2 experiments.  The mugs traded 
in Part 2 of each of the two series of experiments are shown plotted in red in the figure.  Plotted 
in blue are the predicted volumes of trade (6).  Note that in three of the eleven total experiments 
six or more of the mugs trade; in eight less than 6 mugs trade.  Generally we observed much 
more trading volume than obtained by KKT, but still substantially below the prediction, tending 
to confirm the undertrading hypothesis. 
Figure-1: 
UPDA Exchange experiments: Volume of mugs traded in constant and random 
equilibrium experiments 
 
Two series of experiments, constant and random equilibrium, were run. In each experiment 
24 different subjects were randomly assigned to groups of 12 buyers and 12 sellers. Each 
series was divided into two parts. 
 
 The first part was a market experiment while the second part was the mug exchange 
experiment. In the first part each buyer was assigned a value and each seller a cost from the 
distribution [$0, $9.99] at the beginning of each experiment. 
 
 In Part 1 of series 1 each period lasted for 4 minutes. In Part 2 of series 1 and 2 each 
buyer was endowed with a $9.99 cash balance which was theirs to keep if the mug was not 
purchased; each seller was endowed with a University of Arizona emblem mug which was 
theirs to keep if not sold. In series 2, Part 1 used the constant equilibrium environment, but 
in each period a random constant was added to each value, and the values randomly 
assigned to individuals. Part of series 2 was like that of series 1 except that the price tag 
was left on the mug, and this was pointed out to all the subjects. This was done to reduce 
the uncertainty regarding the market or cash value of the mug. The trading time for the mug 
exchange experiment in series 2 was increased from 4 to 6 minutes in four of the six 
experiments. This was done as it appeared that the subjects were still expecting their bids 
when the period ended after 4 minutes. 
Figure 2: Two series of experiments were run. Each series was divided into Part 1 and 2. In 
each experiments 24 different subjects were assigned randomly to groups of 12 buyers and 
12 sellers. 
In Part 1 of Series 1 each buyer was assigned a value and each seller a cost by a 
random draw with replacement from the uniform distribution [$0, $9.99] at the beginning 
of each of the 10 (12) trading periods. This baseline served as a training session. All periods 
lasted 4 minutes. In Part 2, Series 1 and 2, each buyer was endowed with a $9.99 cash 
balance which was theirs to keep if no mug was purchased; each seller was endowed with a 
University of Arizona emblem mug priced at $9.95 in the University bookstore and was 
theirs to keep if not sold. Each subject was paid their earnings in cash from the induced 
value training experiments in Part 1 of each of the sessions.  
In Series 2, Part 1 used the constant volume environment shown in Figure 2, but in 
each period a random constant was added to each value, and the values randomly assigned 
to individuals. Part 2 of Series 2 was like that of Series 1 except that the price tag ($9.95) 
was left on each mug, and this was pointed out to the subjects. This was done to reduce 
uncertainty concerning the cash or market value of the mug in each group. Also in Series 2 
the trading time was increased from 4 to 6 minutes in four of the six experiments. This was 
done because it appeared that the subjects were still adjusting their bids and offers when the 
period ended (see Figure 2: several subjects are within 10-30 cents of a trade). Most mug 
experiments in Series 1 and 2 were characterized by under revelation on the part of both 
Buyers and Sellers. Conclusion: The WTA/WTP discrepancy can be negligible, but one can 
still get undertrading from under revelation. 
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It is clear that both buyers and sellers under 
reveal their costs and valuations.  Given that 
the WTP/WTA discrepancy is negligible, it  
follows that undertrading can be due to 
under revelation.
